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JUDICIAL SENTENCING DISCRETION POSTBOOKER: ARE JUDGES GETTING A DISTORTED
VIEW THROUGH THE LENS OF SOCIAL
NETWORKING SITES?
Christina R. Weatherford∗
INTRODUCTION
Jessica Binkerd, a graduate of the University of California, Santa
Barbara,1 probably never imagined that pictures taken from her
MySpace website would one day help send her to jail. Regrettably,
that is exactly what happened. On August 6, 2006, Binkerd was
driving her co-worker, twenty-five-year-old Alex Baer, home from a
party when she swerved into oncoming traffic and collided with
another car.2 Unfortunately, Baer did not survive the accident.3
Binkerd’s blood alcohol level was more than twice the legal limit.4
Binkerd was subsequently charged and convicted of vehicular
manslaughter without gross negligence and driving under the
influence of alcohol causing injury.5 In 2007, a Santa Barbara
superior court judge disregarded the probation department’s
recommendation of less than a one year jail sentence,6 opting instead
to impose a much harsher penalty of five years and four months in
state prison.7 Despite pleas for leniency from the victim’s family,8
∗ J.D. Candidate, 2011, Georgia State University College of Law. Thanks to Professor Caren
Morrison and the Law Review editors for their valuable insight and suggestions.
1. Steve Chawkins, Grieving Mother Hopes Motion for Mercy Will Prevail, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 22,
2007, at B1, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2007/jan/22/local/me-mercy22 [hereinafter
Chawkings, Grieving Mother Hopes Motion for Mercy Will Prevail].
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. People v. Binkerd, 155 Cal. App. 4th 1143, 1146, 1146 n.2 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007).
5. Id. at 1146. Binkerd was also charged with driving with a blood alcohol content of 0.20 percent
or higher causing injury, but the charge was dismissed. Id. at 1146–47.
6. Id. at 1150.
7. Id. at 1147 (overruling sentence on unrelated grounds). Binkerd was ultimately sentenced to
three years in jail after a California Court of Appeals judge overturned the original sentence and
remanded the case for resentencing. Id. at 1150–51; Chris Meagher, Drunk Driver Sentenced to Three
Years, SANTA BARBARA INDEP., May 13, 2008, http://www.independent.com/news/2008/may/13/drunkdriver-sentenced-three-years/.
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Judge Lodge ultimately decided that pictures posted on MySpace of
Binkerd wearing an “I heart Patr–n” t-shirt and drinking with friends
after the fatal accident9 indicated a lack of remorse that warranted a
tougher sentence.10
Binkerd is not alone. In the last few years, several similar cases
have resulted in longer sentences partially due to information taken
from social networking sites being presented at the sentencing
hearing.11
In a world where Facebook and MySpace are among the top five
most popular websites12 and twenty-one million people are
“tweeting”13 in the United States alone,14 one can see how the
plethora of information available online and the ease with which it
can be accessed will have a significant impact on the criminal justice
system. Many courts already grapple with how to deal with the
Internet. For example, the Michigan Supreme Court has gone so far
8. Steve Chawkins, Judge Snubs Victim’s Kin’s Plea for Mercy, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2007, at B1,
available at http://articles.latimes.com/2007/jan/27/local/me-mercy27 [hereinafter Chawkins, Judge
Snubs Victim’s Kin’s Pleas for Mercy].
9. Sonia Lucyga, Pictures Affect Sentencing in UCSB Student DUI Case, DAILY NEXUS (Santa
Barbara, CA), Feb. 1, 2007, available at http://www.dailynexus.com/2007-02-01/pictures-affectsentencing-in-ucsb-student-dui-case/.
10. Chawkins, Judge Snubs Victim’s Kin’s Plea for Mercy, supra note 8.
11. See, e.g., Melissa Evans, Internet Plays Key Role in Vehicular Manslaughter Sentence, SANTA
BARBARA NEWSROOM, Apr. 14, 2007, available at http://www.santabarbaranewsroom.com/news/crime-justice/internet-plays-key-role-in-vehicular-manslaughter-sentence.html (showing pictures of defendant
holding a glass of wine and drinking related comments defendant posted on MySpace used by District
Attorney); Eric Tucker, Web Photos Work Against Defendants, CHI. TRIB., July 20, 2008, at 4
(describing how a prosecutor presented pictures from Facebook of defendant dressed in an inmate
costume at a Halloween party two weeks after a crash that seriously injured a woman).
12. Daniel E. Harmon, Five Months of “Faces”: Notes on Social Networking’s Advantages & Risks,
26 No. 24 LAWYER’S PC 1 (2009) (noting Facebook ranked third and MySpace ranked fifth on Alexa:
The Web Information Company’s “Top Sites,” which ranks the 100 most popular websites in the United
States); see also Leah DaSilva, Note, The Next Generation of Sexual Conduct: Expanding The
Protective Reach of Rape Shield Laws to Include Evidence Found on MySpace, 13 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL &
APP. ADVOC. 211, 214 (2008) (noting that MySpace has consistently ranked in the top ten most heavily
visited websites in the United States since 2007); Peter T. Wakiyama & Odia Kagan, Facebook Vanity
URLs May Hurt More Than Just One’s Pride, 21 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. No. 9, 7 (2009) (noting
that since its founding in early 2004, Facebook has gained more than 200 million registered users).
13. See James Cool & Thomas Young, Do Well By Doing Good, 45 TRIAL 32, 36 (Aug. 2009)
(“Twitter is a ‘microblogging’ site that allows you to tell members of your network what you are doing
or thinking with 140-character status updates called ‘tweets.’”).
14. Nielsenwire, Social Media Stats: Myspace Music Growing, Twitter’s Big Move, July 17, 2009,
http://blog.nielsen.com/nielsenwire/online_mobile/social-media-stats-myspace-music-growing-twittersbig-move/.

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol27/iss3/5

2

Weatherford: Judicial Sentencing Discretion Post-Booker: Are Judges Getting a

2011]

JUDICIAL SENTENCING DISCRETION POST-BOOKER

675

as banning jurors from using all electronic communications during
trial.15 Presumably, this move is in reaction to recent cases of jurors
posting information about an ongoing trial online16 and going online
to research aspects of the trial.17
Social networking sites have also affected criminal procedure. For
example, scholars have begun to argue that rape shield laws should
be expanded to include online behavior in the definition of sexual
conduct.18 Although courts have started to confront problems facing
the criminal justice system in the age of the Internet, one area where
these pitfalls have not been addressed is in sentencing.
Judicial sentencing discretion has evolved from a policy of almost
unlimited discretion, to the application of mandatory guidelines with
little judicial discretion allowed, and recently back to, in many ways,
unlimited discretion.19 This Note addresses the evolution and current
state of judicial sentencing discretion in the United States and
discusses the potential impact the information now available through
social networking sites may have on the sentencing system. Part I
examines the history of the United States sentencing system. This
discussion focuses on the historical backdrop of United States v.
Booker, a 2005 Supreme Court decision holding the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines to be advisory, not mandatory.20 Part II
discusses the rise of the Internet and social networking sites. Part III
examines how the world of social networking sites affects sentencing
determinations. Particular interest is given to the potential for judges
15. MICH. CT. R. 2.511(H)(2)(c)–(d) (amended June 30, 2009, effective Sept. 1, 2009) (indicating
that judges must instruct jurors that they may not “use a computer, cellular phone, or other electronic
device with communication capabilities while in attendance at trial or during deliberation” or “to obtain
or disclose information about the case when they are not in court”).
16. See United States v. Fumo, No. 06-319, 2009 WL 1688482, at *57–67 (E.D. Pa. June 17, 2009)
(making a motion for new trial based on juror’s postings on Twitter and Facebook during trial); United
States v. Fumo, 639 F. Supp. 2d 544, 547 (E.D. Pa. 2009) (noting a second motion for new trial based on
jurors exposure to media reports regarding use of social networking sites during the trial).
17. See John Schwartz, As Jurors Turn to Google and Twitter, Mistrials Are Popping Up, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 18, 2009, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/18/us/18juries.html
(mistrial declared in Federal case after nine jurors admitted to doing independent online research
regarding a complicated prescription drug case).
18. See generally DaSilva, supra note 12.
19. See discussion infra Part I.
20. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005) (Breyer, J.).
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to obtain a distorted view of defendants from their online profiles and
what impact this may have on sentencing determinations. Part IV
proposes potential ways courts can prevent this distorted view from
inappropriately impacting sentencing determinations, including
imposing new limits on what evidence judges may use to make their
sentencing determinations. However, this Note also recognizes the
current trend in Supreme Court decisions moving towards a preGuidelines approach of unlimited judicial discretion and recognizes
that because of the current climate of the Supreme Court, limits on
judicial discretion are unlikely. Thus, this Note ultimately suggests
that unless the Supreme Court changes its view on judicial sentencing
discretion and allows limitations on the use of information from
social networking sites, the potential for a distorted view of
defendants may have to be an accepted risk of the sentencing system.
I. EVOLUTION OF JUDICIAL SENTENCING DISCRETION IN THE UNITED
STATES
The determination of an appropriate sentence is a difficult issue for
judges.21 And, it is a responsibility that falls squarely to the judge
alone.22 The amount of sentencing discretion allotted to judges has
varied throughout history. Traditionally, judges were granted almost
unlimited discretion subject only to the bounds of the Constitution
and criminal statutes.23 The implementation of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines restrained judicial sentencing discretion by
imposing mandatory sentence ranges applied mechanically based on
21. United States v. Hayes, 589 F.2d 811, 827 n.9 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied 444 U.S. 866 (1979).
22. 3 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE CRIMINAL § 526 at 88–
89 (3d ed. 1998).
23. See 18 U.S.C. § 3577 (1976) (“No limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the
background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a court of the United
States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence.”); Dorszynski v.
United States, 418 U.S. 424, 437 (1974) (discussing the “unfettered sentencing discretion” given to trial
judges); see also U.S. CONST. amend VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”); William W. Berry III, Discretion Without
Guidance: The Need to Give Meaning to § 3553 After Booker and Its Progeny, 40 CONN. L. REV. 631,
635 (2008) (“Throughout the first two hundred years of the United States, Congress typically provided
statutory maximums or sentencing ranges for federal crimes and left federal judges broad discretion to
consider any aggravating or mitigating factor they deemed relevant.”).
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specified factors.24 Recently, the policy of broad judicial discretion
has reemerged.25
A. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines
In 1949, the United States Supreme Court stated that a sentencing
judge is permitted to “exercise a wide discretion in the sources and
types of evidence used to assist him in determining the kind and
extent of punishment to be imposed within limits fixed by law.”26
Under this system of indeterminate sentencing, uniformity and
predictability were lacking due to the variation of sentences imposed
for similarly situated offenders.27 This view of unregulated discretion
continued largely unchecked until the mid-1980s.28
It was not until Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act of
1984 establishing the United States Sentencing Commission29 that a
significant move was made to restrict the largely unfettered discretion
allotted to sentencing judges.30 The Commission promulgated the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines in 1987, which drastically narrowed
judicial discretion by mandating a sentence range based on the
seriousness of the defendant’s offense and his past criminal history.31
24. See generally U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (Nov. 2009); see also discussion infra
Part I.A.
25. See discussion infra Part I.B–C.
26. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246 (1949).
27. See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 113 (1996) (“[T]he Guidelines provide uniformity,
predictability, and a degree of detachment lacking in our earlier system.”); Exxon Shipping Co. v.
Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2627 (2008) (“[A] penalty should be reasonably predictable in its severity” so
criminals “can look ahead with some ability to know what the stakes are in choosing one course of
action or another.”).
28. See 18 U.S.C. § 3577 (1976) (“No limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the
background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a court of the United
States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence.”); United States v.
Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446 (1972) (noting that federal judges have “wide discretion in determining what
sentence to impose” and “may appropriately conduct an inquiry broad in scope, largely unlimited either
as to the kind of information he may consider, or the source from which it may come”).
29. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 217, 98 Stat. 1987, 2017–18 (1984)
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 991 (2006)).
30. Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 437 (1974) (discussing “unfettered” judicial
discretion); see generally Robert J. Anello & Jodi M. Peikin, Evolving Roles in Federal Sentencing: The
Post-Booker/Fanfan World, 2005 FED. CTS. L. REV. 9 (2005) (describing the progression of federal
sentencing).
31. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1 (2009) (instructions for determining
sentence range).
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Under the Guidelines, a judge must first consult the sentencing grid
to determine the “base offense level.”32 Once the base level is
determined, the judge may adjust the offense level upward or
downward based on listed offense characteristics.33 Further
adjustment is then made based on the victim, role of the defendant,
acceptance of responsibility, criminal history, and offender
characteristics.34 According to Congress, the Sentencing Reform Act,
through the Guidelines, sought to remedy the two major pitfalls of
indeterminate sentencing: unwarranted disparity and uncertainty.35
Initial reaction to the Guidelines was not positive. In fact, in the
three years following the passage of the Guidelines two hundred
federal judges held them unconstitutional.36 It was not until the
Supreme Court ruled the Sentencing Guidelines were constitutional
in 198937 that judges began consistently imposing sentences based on
the Guidelines. In the following years judges applied the Guidelines
with intense rigor.38 Recently, however, the Supreme Court has
slowly begun to return judicial discretion to the sentencing system.39

32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 991(b)(1)(B), 994(f) (2006); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 366
(1989) (citing S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 38, 65 (1983)).
36. Nancy Gertner, From Omnipotence to Impotence: American Judges and Sentencing, 4 OHIO ST.
J. CRIM. L. 523, 524 (2007) (citing KATE STITH & JOSE A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING
GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 196 n.12 (1998)); see also, e.g., Gubiensio-Ortiz v. Kanahele, 857
F.2d 1245, 1254, 1258–59 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding the statute establishing the Federal Sentencing
Commission violated the separation of powers doctrine by requiring the Commission be composed of at
least three federal judges and authorizing those judges to promulgate substantive regulations, a duty
reserved to the legislature).
37. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 371, 384 (finding the Sentencing Guidelines do not violate the
nondelegation and separation of powers doctrines of the Constitution).
38. Gertner, supra note 36, at 524 (noting that in the eighteen years following Mistretta “[j]udges at
all levels, trial and appellate, applied the Guidelines as if they were . . . diktats”) (citing KATE STITH &
JOSE CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 95 (1998)).
39. See discussion infra Part I.B.
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B. The Booker Decision
1. Decisions Leading to Booker: Apprendi and Blakely
For approximately two decades the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
remained mandatory.40 However, in a line of cases centered on the
constitutionality of sentencing guidelines that began in 2000 and
culminated with the 2005 Booker decision, the Supreme Court
ultimately decided the Federal Sentencing Guidelines are advisory,
not mandatory.41 The reasoning that eventually led to the Booker
decision began with the Court’s landmark decision in Apprendi v.
New Jersey.42 In Apprendi, the Court invalidated a sentence based on
a “hate crime” enhancement that increased the sentence range from
five to ten years to between ten and twenty years.43 The Court
determined that the sentence enhancement violated the defendant’s
Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial because the enhancement
required the judge to make factual determinations instead of the
jury.44 The Court held that “any fact that increases the penalty for a
crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted
to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.”45
Four years after Apprendi, the Court reaffirmed its holding in
Blakely v. Washington.46 In Blakely, the Court invalidated part of
Washington’s Sentencing Reform Act for violating the Sixth
Amendment.47 The trial judge imposed a sentence that was three
years above the standard range statutorily prescribed because he
found Blakely had acted with “deliberate cruelty.”48 Washington’s
Sentencing Reform Act provided a judge could impose an
“exceptional sentence” based on a finding of aggravating factors.49
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
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See discussion supra Part I.A.
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005).
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
Id. at 468–69.
Id. at 491–92.
Id. at 490.
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
Id. at 303–05.
Id. at 298.
Id. at 299 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9.94A.120(2), 9.94A.390 (2000)).
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Although Blakely’s sentence was within the maximum authorized by
the statute regulating felonies, the Court held that the “‘statutory
maximum’ for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge
may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury
verdict or admitted by the defendant.”50 Soon after the Blakely
decision, courts and scholars began to question whether similar
sentencing enhancements under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
also violated the Sixth Amendment.51 A year later the Supreme Court
answered this question in United States v. Booker.52
2. The Booker Decision
Freddie J. Booker was convicted of possession with the intent to
distribute at least fifty grams of crack cocaine.53 According to the
applicable statute, the maximum sentence for the offense was life
imprisonment,54 and the Sentencing Guidelines imposed a base level
sentence range of 210 months to 262 months in prison.55 However,
the judge determined Booker possessed an additional 566 grams of
crack and was guilty of obstructing justice and was thus subject to a
new sentencing range of 360 months to life imprisonment.56 The
judge chose 360 months.57
In a five to four decision, the Supreme Court overturned Booker’s
sentence and held that the mandatory application of the Sentencing
Guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury.58 The
Court relied on the Blakely and Apprendi reasoning and held that in
order to preserve a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial
“[a]ny fact . . . which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the
maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a
50. Id. at 303.
51. Berry, supra note 23, at 648 (citing Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein, Beyond Blakely, 51-DEC.
FED. LAW. 53 (2004), and Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 272–73 (2007)).
52. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
53. Id. at 227.
54. Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) (2008)).
55. Id. (citing U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 2D1.1(c)(4), 4A1.1 (2003)).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Booker, 543 U.S. at 233–35 (Stevens, J.) (Scalia, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg, JJ., joining).
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jury verdict must be admitted by the defendant or proved to the jury
beyond a reasonable doubt.”59 The Court held the Sentencing
Guidelines as written violated this principle because the Guidelines
force a judge to impose a sentence within the specified range upon
finding some additional fact without allowing the jury to weigh in.60
However, the Court did not completely abandon the Guidelines.
Instead, in an opinion written by Justice Breyer, the Court determined
the appropriate remedy for the unconstitutional application of the
Guidelines was to remove those provisions calling for mandatory
application.61 Thus, the Court’s decision made the Guidelines
“effectively
advisory”
while
maintaining
their
overall
62
constitutionality.
C. Judicial Sentencing Discretion Post-Booker
Since the Court’s decision to make the Guidelines advisory, lower
courts have been unsure exactly how the Guidelines are to be applied
in sentencing determinations. Attempting to follow Booker, many
courts have implemented a three-step process that begins with a
calculation of the appropriate sentence range according to the
Guidelines.63 In determining the appropriate sentence range, the
judge takes into consideration the parties’ arguments and certain
factors enumerated in § 3553(a).64 These factors are: (1) “the nature
and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics
of the defendant,” (2) the need to punish, deter, protect the public,
and rehabilitate, (3) the available sentences, (4) the sentence range for
similar crimes, (5) policy, (6) “the need to avoid unwarranted

59. Id. at 244.
60. Id. at 234–35 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (2000)).
61. Id. at 245 (Breyer, J.) (Rehnquist, C.J., O’Connor, Kennedy, and Ginsburg, JJ., joining).
62. Id.
63. Berry, supra note 23, at 650–51 (citing Booker, 543 U.S. at 259–60 (Breyer, J.)); see, e.g., Gall
v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007) (“[A] district court should begin all sentencing proceedings by
correctly calculating the applicable Guidelines range.”) (citing Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338
(2007)).
64. Gall, 552 U.S. at 49–50 (“[A]fter giving both parties an opportunity to argue for whatever
sentence they deem appropriate, the district judge should then consider all of the § 3553(a) factors to
determine whether they support the sentence requested by the party.”).
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sentence disparities,” and (7) “the need to provide restitution.”65
These factors are intended to inform the judge’s determination of an
appropriate sentence while striving to maintain the overarching
principle that a sentence be “sufficient but not greater than
necessary.”66 Based on consideration of these factors, the judge
determines whether a sentence within the Guidelines is appropriate.67
Finally, the judge must identify the sentence being imposed and
adequately explain the reasons for that sentence.68
The problem post-Booker is that many critics, including Justice
Scalia, see the Court’s decision as a return to indeterminate
sentencing because removing the mandatory application of the
Guidelines allows judges to impose their own perceptions of justice.69
II. THE RISE OF SOCIAL NETWORKING
Since online social networking began to develop in the 1990s, it
has become a “universal phenomenon.”70 Online communication has
become vital to connecting with the outside world for today’s
youth.71 According to a 2007 study by the National School Boards
Association, 96% of students with access to the Internet have visited
a social networking site.72 Additionally, a 2009 study by Pew Internet
65. 18 U.S.C § 3553(a) (2006).
66. Id.
67. Berry, supra note 23, at 651; see, e.g., United States v. Melvin, No. 06–33(FSH), 2009 WL
3128358, at *6 (D.N.J. Sept. 25, 2009) (holding consideration of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors
required a sentence outside the guidelines range “in order to justly meet the criteria of § 3553(a)”).
68. Berry, supra note 23, at 651 (citing Booker, 543 U.S. at 259–61).
69. Booker, 543 U.S. at 304–05 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part) (“The statute provides no order of
priority among all those factors . . . the statute—absent the mandate of § 3553(b)(1)—authorizes the
judge to apply his own perceptions of just punishment, deterrence, and protection of the public . . . .”).
70. DaSilva, supra note 12, at 213 (noting Classmates.com and Evite.com, launched in 1995 and
1998 respectively, were some of the first online social networking sites); see also Alessandro Acquisti &
Ralph Gross, Imagine Communities: Awareness, Information Sharing, and Privacy on the Facebook 1
(2006),
http://www.heinz.cmu.edu/~acquisti/papers/acquisti-gross-facebook-privacy-PET-final.pdf
(“[O]nline social networks are no longer niche phenomena: millions of people around the world, young
and old, knowingly and willing use Friendster, MySpace, Match.com, LinkedIn, and [a] hundred other
sites to communicate, find friends, dates, and jobs . . . .”).
71. Kevin P. Brady, Student-Created Fake Online Profiles Using Social Networking Websites, 244
EDUC. LAW REP. 907, 907 (2009).
72. Id. (citing National School Boards Association, Creating and Connecting: Research and
Guidelines on Online Social and Educational Networking (2007), http://nsba.org/
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and American Life Project found 47% of online adults use social
networking sites.73 Facebook, one of the most popular social
networking sites, boasts more than 500 million active users who
upload more than 30 billion pieces of content to the site each
month.74
A. Defining Social Networking Sites
Generally speaking, social networking sites are “web-based
services that allow individuals to (1) construct a public or semi-public
profile within a bounded system, (2) articulate a list of other users
with whom they share a connection, and (3) view and traverse their
list of connections and those made by others within the system.”75
While each social networking site is unique, a common characteristic
is the user profile.76 Member profiles generally contain personal
information such as age, gender, interests, and hobbies.77 Profiles can
also contain audio and visual content, including video clips and
digital photographs.78 Once the user profile is created, the user
“become[s] part of [a] larger online social network[] by linking
their . . . profile[]” with other users.79 Many social networking sites
are global in nature and have millions of users across a broad
demographic.80

SecondaryMenu/TLN/CreatingandConnecting.aspzx).
73. Amanda Lenhart et al., Social Media & Mobile Internet Use Among Teens and Young Adults,
Feb. 3, 2010, http://pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2010/PIP_Social_Media_and_Young_
Adults_Report_Final_with_toplines.pdf (presenting the findings of a survey conducted between Aug. 18
and Sept. 14, 2009 of 2,253 adults age 18 and over).
74. Facebook, Statistics, http://www.facebook.com/press/info.php?statistics (last visited Aug. 25,
2010).
75. Danah M. Boyd & Nicole B. Ellison, Social Network Sites: Definition, History, and Scholarship,
13 J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. 1, Art. 11 (2007), http://jcmc.indiana.edu/vol13/issue1/
boyd.ellison.html.
76. Id.
77. RICHARD RAYSMAN & PETER BROWN, COMPUTER LAW: DRAFTING AND NEGOTIATING FORMS §
15.06 (2009), available at 2008 WL 4520029.
78. Id.
79. Brady, supra note 71, at 908.
80. Raysman, supra note 77; see, e.g., Facebook, Statistics, http://www.facebook.com/press/
info.php?statistics (last visited Aug. 25, 2010) (“70% of Facebook users are outside the United States.”).
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B. The Role of Social Networking Sites in the Courtroom
Social networking sites have impacted several aspects of the legal
system in the United States. Of particular importance are concerns
regarding the potential misuse of these sites. One area of concern is
the use of information posted online to discredit claims of sexual
assault by tainting the alleged victim’s character.81 In response to this
fear, scholars have argued that the definition of sexual conduct under
rape shield laws should be expanded to include online behavior.82 By
expanding the definition in this way, evidence of an alleged rape
victim’s online behavior becomes inadmissible.
Another area where the impact of social networking sites can be
seen is in courtroom procedure. There have been several recent cases
of jurors impermissibly using social networking sites during trials
that have resulted in some courts banning all electronic
communications by jurors.83 In one such case, juror Eric Wuest,
during the prominent fraud trial of the former Pennsylvania State
Senator Vincent Fumo, posted messages regarding the trial’s
progression on his Facebook and Twitter accounts.84 This led Fumo’s
defense team to file a motion to halt jury deliberations and remove
the juror.85 The judge ultimately decided not to remove Wuest based
on his determination that the juror remained credible and had not
influenced the other jurors.86 Fumo’s defense lawyer subsequently
filed an additional motion for a new trial based on the other jurors’
81. See generally DaSilva, supra note 12 (arguing for the expansion of the definition of “sexual
conduct” in rape shield laws to include content posted on social networking sites).
82. Id.
83. MICH. CT. R. 2.511(H)(2)(c)–(d) (amended June 30, 2009, effective Sept. 1, 2009) (indicating
that judges must instruct jurors that they may not “use a computer, cellular phone, or other electronic
device with communication capabilities while in attendance at trial or during deliberation” or “to obtain
or disclose information about the case when they are not in court”).
84. United States v. Fumo, No. 06–319, 2009 WL 1688482, at *61 (E.D. Pa. June 17, 2009) (finding
Wuest posted a message to his Twitter account stating, “This is it . . . no looking back now!” and
throughout the trial Wuest made several postings on his Facebook page regarding the status of the trial,
including the statement: “Stay tuned for the big announcement on Monday everyone!” (citing Govt.
Resp. Mot. Judg. Acquittal and for New Trial at 141, May 15, 2009)).
85. Id. at *1.
86. Id. at *67 (“There was no evidence presented by either party showing that [Wuest’s] extra-jury
misconduct had a prejudicial impact on the Defendants. The [c]ourt found, and still maintains, that
Wuest’s actions in no way affected his impartiality.”).
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exposure to media reports of Wuest’s use of social networking sites.87
Although both motions were ultimately dismissed,88 the case brought
to light the potential for a juror’s use of social networking sites to
result in a mistrial.
In a similar case, an Arkansas building materials company
appealed a $12.6 million verdict against them on the ground that
during the trial a juror posted Twitter messages that showed bias.89 In
March 2009, the fear of a mistrial based on jurors’ improper use of
the Internet became a reality in a Florida courtroom. After eight
weeks of trial, a federal judge declared a mistrial after he discovered
nine jurors had done independent online research about the
complicated pharmaceutical case.90
III. IMPACT OF SOCIAL NETWORKING SITES ON SENTENCE
DETERMINATIONS
Under the current sentencing system outlined by the Supreme
Court in Booker,91 one of the sentencing factors enumerated in 18
U.S.C § 3553(a) is the “history and characteristics of the
defendant.”92 Furthermore, according to 18 U.S.C. § 3577, “[n]o
limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the
background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an
offense which a court of the United States may receive and consider
for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence.”93 It is in this
aspect of determining an appropriate sentence that information posted
on social networking sites comes into play. As illustrated by the case
of Jessica Binkerd, photographs and comments from a user’s profile
87. United States v. Fumo, 639 F. Supp. 2d 544, 547 (E.D. Pa. 2009).
88. Id.
89. See Renee Loth, Mistrial by Google, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 6, 2009, at A15, available at
http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2009/11/06/mistrial_by_google/
(moving for a mistrial and reversal of a $12 million judgment based on a juror’s Twitter posting stating:
“oh, and nobody buy Stoam. Its [sic] bad mojo and they’ll probably cease to Exist [sic], now that their
wallet is 12m lighter.”).
90. Schwartz, supra note 17.
91. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
92. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) (2006).
93. 18 U.S.C. § 3577 (1976).
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can be introduced as evidence during a sentencing hearing and may
ultimately be a deciding factor in the judge’s determination of the
appropriate sentence.94
Lara Buys, another twenty-two-year-old, was also sentenced to
prison for driving under the influence of alcohol and vehicular
manslaughter based on evidence taken from a social networking
site.95 At the sentencing hearing, the District Attorney presented a
picture of Buys from MySpace that showed her holding a glass of
wine and comments from the same site, one of which read: “My
favorite memory would have been on my birthday one year and you
got hammered drinking Jack and ran home to throw up and ended up
passed out, good times, good times!!”96 In an interview, the District
Attorney explained that the Internet is a new tool that allows
prosecutors to prove what suspects were thinking or if they were
remorseful.97 While the Internet and social networking sites may
seem like a promising tool to gain insight into the minds and
characters of defendants, the question arises whether the information
found on these sites is an accurate depiction of the defendant outside
of the online context.
A. Potential for a Distorted View of Defendants Based on Online
Profiles
Information posted on social networking sites poses particular
concerns that other character evidence typically used at sentencing
hearings does not. First, people have a natural “desire to be cool” that
influences how they decide to portray themselves online.98 The cool
factor of social networking sites has been present from the inception
of the online community. The founders of MySpace, Tom Anderson
and Chris DeWolfe, for example, started the site as a place for local
94. See discussion supra Introduction.
95. Evans, supra note 11.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Danah Boyd, Why Youth (Heart) Social Network Sites: The Role of Networked Publics in
Teenage Social Life, in YOUTH, IDENTITY, AND DIGITAL MEDIA 119, 129 (David Buckingham ed.,
2008) [hereinafter Boyd, Why Youth (Heart) Social Network Sites].
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bands and clubs to promote themselves and connect with fans.99 They
focused on creating an “open” website with few rules emphasizing
users’ ability to “freely express themselves.”100 Add the human desire
to be cool to the unrestrained environment of MySpace, and the result
is profiles that tend to be provocative and often include vulgar
language and references to drugs and alcohol.101
Social networking site users often look to other users’ profiles in
order to judge what information they should present on their own
profile.102 Users carefully choose what they put forward in the hope
of being accepted by their online peers.103 This often results in users
attempting to create a profile they hope will be deemed cool by the
online community.104 This desire is a reflection of the basic human
desire to be accepted by one’s peers.105 The problem with the online
setting is the potentially public nature of the information posted.106
Social networking site users are faced with the same choice many
teens face in everyday life: Cool or lame? Popular or unpopular?107
Unfortunately, it seems many users do not understand the increased
stakes of choosing to be cool online.108 The desire to be cool may
result in an apparent contradiction between a user’s online persona
and her true character.109 One scholar, Danah Boyd, gives an example
of such contradiction in her book based on a two-year study of United
States based youth engagement with MySpace.110 She received a call
99. Patricia Sellers, MySpace Cowboys, FORTUNE, Sept. 4, 2006, at 66, available at
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2006/09/04/8384727/index.htm.
100. DaSilva, supra note 12, at 215.
101. Id. at 215–16 (citing David Narkiewicz, The Dangers of MySpace, Facebook and YouTube, 30
PA. LAW. 56, 57 (2008) (noting MySpace user who posted “sex, drugs and rock and roll” on list of
interests) and Robert Sprague, Googling Job Applicants: Incorporating Personal Information into
Hiring Decisions, 23 LAB. LAW 19, 36–37 (2007) (discussing employment recruiters discovery of
potential candidates “risqué ‘photographs and provocative comments about drinking, recreational drug
use, and sexual exploits' . . .” posted on online social networking sites)).
102. See Boyd, Why Youth (Heart) Social Network Sites, supra note 98, at 129.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 133.
107. Id.
108. Boyd, Why Youth (Heart) Social Network Sites, supra note 98, at 133.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 120.
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from an admissions officer of a prestigious college who had planned
to admit a young black male from a poor urban community.111 The
admissions office had been deterred from this decision by the gang
related content they found on the applicant’s MySpace profile, which
completely contradicted his admissions essay that had discussed the
problems with gangs in his community.112 Boyd offered this
explanation of the apparent contradiction: “Perhaps he needed to
acquiesce to the norms of the gangs while living in his neighborhood,
in order to survive and make it through high school to apply to
college?”113 Boyd explains that the problem highlights how context is
crucial to properly understanding information.114 When an outsider to
the social networking community, such as an admissions officer,
potential employer, or judge, views information on a user’s profile,
they are unprepared to understand the context.115 Instead, they project
the context in which they relate to the individual offline onto the
individual in the online community.116
In the case of Jessica Binkerd, the judge was presented with
images of Binkerd drinking with friends.117 Viewed in isolation, these
pictures only portray one image of the defendant: an irresponsible girl
who likes to party. However, add to them the fact that Binkerd was a
recent college graduate who volunteered with autistic children and
one day hoped to become a psychiatrist,118 and the image of a hardpartying girl becomes a little harder to imagine.
Throughout history, public life has not been documented and
distributed to others to judge, except in the case of celebrities whose
lives were deemed important enough to share.119 With the advent of
the Internet and social networking sites, online life has become public
life. Information is now easily documented and distributed to a wide
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id. at 133.
Id.
Id.
Boyd, Why Youth (Heart) Social Network Sites, supra note 98, at 133.
Id.
Id.
See discussion supra Introduction.
Chawkins, Grieving Mother Hopes Motion for Mercy Will Prevail, supra note 1.
Boyd, Why Youth (Heart) Social Network Sites, supra note 98, at 137.
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range of audiences that can use that information in any number of
ways.120 In the courtroom, this means a judge may be inundated with
information that at one time would not have been documented or
available for consideration. Thus, the question arises whether the
Supreme Court’s current trend of increasing judicial discretion in
sentencing determination is the best method for handling the
increased amount of personal information available for consideration.
IV. PREVENTING A DISTORTED VIEW FROM AFFECTING SENTENCING
A. Limiting Judicial Sentencing Discretion
One potential method for preventing online information from
presenting a distorted view of defendants is to limit its use in
sentencing determinations. However, a limitation on judicial
discretion is unlikely to occur given the recent Supreme Court
jurisprudence.121 With the Booker decision making the Sentencing
Guidelines advisory, the Supreme Court has given much sentencing
discretion back to judges.122 Furthermore, it is well established that a
sentencing judge is able to consider virtually any information that
may bear on the determination of the appropriate sentence.123 Adding
to this wide discretion is the general rule adopted by courts that
evidence considered by a judge prior to imposing a sentence does not
need to conform to the same standard as evidence presented at trial in

120. Id.
121. See discussion supra Part I.
122. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (holding that the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines are subject to jury trial requirements of the Sixth Amendment, thus the provision of the act
making the guidelines mandatory is unconstitutional and must be severed); discussion supra Part C
(discussing judicial sentencing discretion post-Booker).
123. See, e.g., Wasman v. United States, 468 U.S. 559, 563 (1984) (noting the “well-established”
discretion allotted to sentencing judges and the ability to consider “any and all information that
reasonably might bear on the proper sentence for the particular defendant”); United States v. BorreroIsaza, 887 F.2d 1349, 1352 (9th Cir. 1989) (noting that sentencing judges have “virtually unfettered
discretion” and can consider a “largely unlimited variety of information”); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3577
(1976) (“No limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the background, character, and
conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a court of the United States may receive and consider
for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence.”).
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order to comport with due process requirements.124 Combined, the
Booker decision and the general rules of sentencing effectively mean
that information taken from online social networking sites is now
considered under the broad 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) standard of “the
history and characteristics of the defendant.”125 Thus, sentencing
judges, who may not understand the nature and context of online
social networking, are now confronted with information taken out of
the online context and are using such information to make sentencing
determinations.
Justice Scalia’s criticism of the Supreme Court’s move toward
unfettered judicial sentencing discretion indicates that some members
of the Court may be uncomfortable with the idea of allowing
sentencing judges to consider unlimited evidence when making
sentencing determinations.126 As more judges are confronted with
information from social networking sites and are faced with the task
of interpreting this information outside the online context, Justice
Scalia’s criticism of unfettered sentencing discretion is likely to take
on a new meaning. However, until the Supreme Court addresses this
issue and places some limitation on the information sentencing
judges may consider, these judges are left to weigh and balance this
information on their own.
B. Alternatives to Limiting Judicial Discretion
Given the broad discretion allotted to sentencing judges and the
unlikelihood of imposing direct limitations on the use of information
124. United States v. Morgan, 595 F.2d 1134, 1136 (9th Cir. 1979) (citing Williams v. New York, 337
U.S. 241 (1949)); see also PAUL S. MILICH, COURTROOM HANDBOOK ON GEORGIA EVIDENCE 459
(2009) (noting that the Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply to sentencing) (citing FED. R. Evid.
1101(d)(3)). The Morgan court also notes certain exceptions to this general rule. Morgan, 595 F.2d at
1136. First, a sentencing judge may not consider unconstitutional prior convictions. Id. (citing United
States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443 (1972)). Second, sentencing judges may not consider false information.
Id. (citing Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948)). Third, sentencing determinations “may not rely
upon the information contained in the presentence report unless it is amplified by information such as to
be persuasive of the validity of the charge there made.” Id. (citing United States v. Weston, 448 F.2d
626, 634 (9th Cir. 1971)).
125. 18 U.S.C § 3553(a) (2006).
126. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 304–05 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The statute provides no order of priority
among all those factors . . . the statute—absent the mandate of § 3553(b)(1)—authorizes the judge to
apply his own perceptions of just punishment, deterrence, and protection of the public . . . .”).
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from social networking sites, other methods to prevent a distorted
view of defendants should be considered by courts and social
networking site users themselves.
1. Educating Judges as to the Potential for Distortion
Each state implements its own judicial continuing education
requirements. Georgia, for example, mandates that each new judge
attend a new judge orientation course sponsored by the Institute of
Continuing Judicial Education,127 and every two years judges are
required to attend at least twenty-four hours of continuing education
programs.128 Participation in specialized training and education in
topics outside ethics and professionalism is encouraged but not
required.129
Federal judges are not required to attend any continuing education
programs. However, organizations such as the Foundation for
Research on Economics and the Environment (FREE) provide
optional training and educational opportunities for federal judges.
These organizations offer programs that address current issues facing
judges. For example, in 2010 FREE offered a program titled:
Terrorism, Civil Liberty, and National Security: A Program for
Federal Judges, State Supreme Court Justices, and Law Professors.130
One possible way to prevent information from social networking
sites from being misinterpreted and misused in sentencing
determinations is to provide educational programs to judges that
address the potential distortion that can occur when such information
is taken outside of the online context. By educating judges, who
ultimately have the sole responsibility of weighing information
presented at the sentencing hearing and determining an appropriate
sentence,131 about the context of online social networking
communities, it is less likely that information taken from these sites
127. GA. UNIF. STATE CT. R. 43.C (2003).
128. Id. at 43.A.
129. Id. at 43.D.
130. Foundation for Research on Economics and the Environment, Current Program Offerings,
http://www.free-eco.org/current_programs.php (last visited Aug. 25, 2010).
131. See discussion supra Part I.C.
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will automatically be presumed to present a true depiction of the
defendant. Furthermore, through education, judges will be better
equipped to properly weigh and balance information from social
networking sites under the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. Thus, there
will be less chance of a distorted view of defendants during the
sentencing process.
2. Warning Social Networking Site Users
One of the most fascinating aspects of online social networking is
users’ willingness to post highly personal data, which may not even
be an accurate representation of the user’s true character offline, onto
what is essentially a public forum. Studies have indicated several
possible explanations for this behavior.132 The first possibility is that
the “foolishness of youth” results in obliviousness to reputational
risks and inability to foresee the consequences reputational harm may
have later in life.133 Teens and young adults compose the majority of
social networking site users, and the tendency of this age group to
engage in high-risk behavior is well established.134 Thus, it is not
surprising that despite privacy warnings available on most social
networking sites, users report retaining an expectation of privacy.135
The second explanation for users’ willingness to post personal
information online is that users may not fully understand the
technology and long-term implications arising from their online
conduct.136 For example, many users may not comprehend that once
information is posted it cannot truly be removed or that third parties

132. See generally Avner Levin & Patricia Sanchez Abril, Two Notions of Privacy Online, 11 VAND.
J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1001 (2009) (presenting the findings of a study of approximately 2,500 Canadian and
American college students and online social network users between the ages of 18 and 24).
133. Id. at 1017–18 (2009) (citing Kimberly J. Mitchell et al., Linking Youth Internet and
Conventional Problems: Findings from a Clinical Perspective, 15(2) J. AGGRESSION, MALTREATMENT
& TRAUMA 39 (2007)).
134. Id. (citing J. Grunbaum et at., Youth Risk Behavior Surveillance – United States, 2004,
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP., May 21, 2004, available at http://www.cdc.gov/
mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/ss5302a1.htm.).
135. Id. at 1004.
136. Id. at 1018.
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may be able to access, alter, or use posted information.137
Furthermore, only thirty percent of online social network users
surveyed in one study claim to know that they have the option to
control privacy features such as the visibility and searchability of
their profiles.138
These two factors indicate that social network site users need to be
educated as to the potential public uses of information they post
online. Perhaps new regulations requiring social networking sites to
warn users of these potential uses would help users contemplate the
consequences of posting information online before they sign on.
However, because studies indicate that few users actually read the
privacy warnings that are now available and even fewer users seem to
comprehend the true meaning of the warnings,139 it is likely up to
educators and parents to inform youths as to the potential risks of
online social networking. Right now cases like Jessica Binkerd140 can
serve as a warning to users and hopefully raise their awareness as to
the potential downsides of online social networking.
CONCLUSION
Given the expanding role social networking sites are playing in the
lives of millions of people across the world,141 the impact of the
online world will undoubtedly continue to be felt in many areas of the
legal system.142 Courts will continue to face issues concerning the
use, and often times the misuse, of the vast array of information
available online.143 Sentencing judges will likely confront more and
more information concerning defendants’ character that was
undocumented and unavailable for consideration prior to the rise of
137. Id. However, the author notes that “[t]his argument . . . ignores the fact that the majority of
online socializers grew up online and are perhaps more net-savvy than previous generations.” Id.
138. Acquisti & Gross, supra note 70, at 12 (presenting the findings of a study surveying Facebook
users at a United States academic institution and explaining profile visibility relates to who can read a
user’s profile, while searchability refers to who can find a user’s profile).
139. Id.
140. See discussion supra Introduction.
141. See discussion supra Introduction and Part II.
142. See discussion supra Part II.B and III.
143. See discussion supra Part III.
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social networking sites. While this information may have the
potential to present a distorted view of defendants, the current
Supreme Court jurisprudence holding the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines advisory144 and the well-established broad range of
evidence admissible for sentencing determinations145 means that
limitations on the use of online information are unlikely. Thus, the
best solution may have to be an effort to educate courts as to the
potential distortion that can occur when information from social
networking sites is taken out of the online context.146 As for social
network users, Jessica Binkerd’s story147 should serve as a warning
that information they choose to post online could be used against
them when they least expect it.148

144. See discussion supra Part II.
145. See, e.g., Wasman v. United States, 468 U.S. 559, 563 (1984) (noting the “well established”
discretion allotted to sentencing judges and the ability to consider “any and all information that
reasonably might bear on the proper sentence for the particular defendant”).
146. See discussion supra Part III.A.
147. See discussion supra Introduction.
148. See Evan Wagstaff, Court Case Decision Reveals Dangers of Networking Sites, 87 DAILY
NEXUS Issue 84 (Feb. 28, 2007), http://www.dailynexus.com/2007-02-28/court-case-decision-revealsdangers-of-networking-sites/ (“There’s nothing wrong with MySpace, but when you put all these crazy
pictures on it’s going to come back to bite you. It certainly can be used against you when you least
expect it.”); Utah DUI Trial Lawyer, http://www.utahduilawblog.com/2008/07/articles/utah-duisentencings/utah-duis-face-book-and-my-space/ (July 18, 2008, 12:33 MDT) (“Take your myspace and
facebook pages down. If you can’t do that, tone your pages down. Most of all, confessing your sins on
these pages is just as good as a signed confession to convict you.”).
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